In many situations, such as trade in stock exchanges, agents have many instances to act even though the interaction lasts a relatively short time. The agents in such situations can often coordinate their actions in advance, but coordination during the game consumes too much time. An equilibrium in such situations has to be sequential in order to handle mistakes made by players. In this paper, we present a new solution concept for innite-horizon dynamic games, which is appropriate for such situations: a sequential uniform normal-form correlated approximate equilibrium. Under additional assumptions (players have symmetric partial information, each player has a nite number of actions at each stage, and each player may take a nite number of actions), we show that every such a game admits this kind of equilibrium.
Introduction
In the modern world there are many situations that last a relatively short time but in which agents have many instances to act, such as on-line auctions and trade in stock exchanges. In many cases dierent agents share similar, though not identical, goals. Such is the case when the agents work in the same nancial institution, and they can coordinate their actions in order to maximize the institution's prot, as well as the contribution of each trader to this prot. December 28, 2009 As an illustrative example consider the following. The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes each month a news release on the U.S. employment situation (ES). This news release is announced in the middle of the trading day in the European stock markets (on the rst Friday of each month at 13:30 London time). The ES announcement has a strong impact on these markets (see Nikkinen et al., 2006 and the references within). Empirical studies (see for example, Christie-David, Chaudhry and Khan, 2002) show that a few tens of minutes elapse before nancial instruments adjust to such announcements. This gap of time (the adjustment period) may provide an opportunity for substantial prot to be made by quick trading (news-playing). Consider the strategic interaction between a few traders in a nancial institution who coordinate in advance their actions in the adjustment period. Each trader can make buy and sell orders for some nancial instruments that are under his responsibility. The traders share a common objective -maximizing the prot of the institution. In addition to this, each trader also has a private objective -maximizing the prot that is made in nancial instruments that are under his responsibility (which inuences his bonuses and prestige).
Three natural questions arise when modeling the strategic interaction among the traders in this example: (1) Which kind of game should be used? (2) Which solution concept should be chosen? (3) Does a solution exist, and can we nd one?
We begin by dealing with the rst question. The adjustment period is relatively short in absolute terms -a few tens of minutes. Nevertheless, the traders have many opportunities to act, as they can make dierent orders in each fraction of a second. In addition, the point in time where the markets are fully adjusted may not be known to the players in real-time. Thus, it seems appropriate to model this situation as a stochastic (dynamic) game with innite-horizon, rather then modeling it as a game with a xed nite large number of stages. See Rubinstein (1991) and Aumann and Maschler (1995, pages 131-137) for discussions why even short strategic interactions may be better analyzed as innitehorizon games.
The issue raised in the second question -which solution concept is appropriate -has several aspects. First, we discuss how each trader evaluates payos at dierent stages of the innite-horizon game. As the interaction is short in absolute time, it is natural to assume that payos are evaluated without discounting. Because, in undiscounted games, payos that are obtained in the rst T stages do not aect the total payo, for every T ; yet the interaction in our example is nite, the solution concept should satisfy uniformity:
it should be an approximate equilibrium in any long enough nite-horizon game. See Aumann and Maschler (1995, pages 138-142) for arguments in favor of this notion.
The traders in the example can freely communicate before the game starts (that is, before the adjustment period begins), and coordinate their strategies once the ES announcement is made. When there are at least three players, under relatively mild conditions, any equilibrium in an extended game with pre-play non-binding communication among the players (cheap talk) is equivalent to a correlated equilibrium, and vice versa (see, e.g., Ben-Porath, 1998) . Aumann (1974) dened correlated equilibrium in a nite normal-form game as a Nash equilibrium in an extended game that includes a correlation device, which sends a private signal to each player before the start of play. The strategy of each player can then depend on the private signal that he received. Therefore the concept of correlated equilibrium is natural in this setup.
For sequential games, two main versions of correlated equilibrium have been studied (see, e.g., Forges 1986 ): normal-form correlated equilibrium, where each player receives a private signal only before the game starts, and extensive-form correlated equilibrium, where each player receives a private signal at each stage of the game. Unlike the cheap communication before the game starts, communication along the play is costly when the time between stages is short, such as in the leading example: the adjustment period is short (a few dozen minutes), and each moment that is spent on communication may slow down the traders and limit their potential prots. Thus, the smaller set of normal-form correlated equilibria is more appropriate in such cases. (Note that every normal-form correlated equilibrium is an extensive-form correlated equilibrium, but the converse is not true.)
As players may make mistakes, or forget what they were supposed to do in the equilibrium, the behavior of the players should be rational also o the equilibrium path. That is, players should best respond also after one player made a mistake, and deviated from the equilibrium strategy prole. This is satised by requiring the equilibrium to be sequential (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) .
The above reasoning limits the plausible outcomes of the game to the set of sequential uniform normal-form correlated equilibria. Myerson (1986a) dened and studied the properties of sequential extensive-form correlated equilibria in nite games, and closely related notions (acceptable and perfect correlated equilibria) were studied in Myerson (1986b) and Dhilon and Mertens (1996) . As innite undiscounted games may only admit approximate equilibria, we dene a sequential normal-form correlated (δ, )-equilibrium, as a strategy prole where with probability at least 1 − δ, no player can earn more than by deviating at any stage of the game and after any history of play (as formally dened in Section 2).
Another desirable property in our setup is that the expected payo of each player be independent of the pre-play communication. This facilitates the implementation of the coordination among the players, as none of them may feel discriminated by the coordination process. Sorin (1998) denes a distribution equilibrium in a normal-form nite game, as a correlated equilibrium where the expected payo of each player is independent of his signal. We generalize Sorin's denition, and dene an approximate constantexpectation correlated equilibrium, as a correlated equilibrium where the expected payo of each player hardly changes when he receives his signal. Every Nash equilibrium is a constant-expectation correlated equilibrium, and, as demonstrated by Sorin (1998) , the set of these equilibria is not convex (see also Section 2).
The rst contribution of this paper is the presentation of a new solution concept for undiscounted dynamic games: a sequential uniform constant-expectation normal-form correlated approximate equilibrium.
We now deal with the third question: proving the existence of this equilibrium. In this paper we prove existence under the simplifying assumption that, throughout the game, the traders have symmetric information on the nancial markets, such as past prices of the dierent markets. This assumption is reasonable given that each trader can electronically access the data on all of these prices. Although in reality each trader may actually focus only on the information that is more relevant for the nancial instruments under his responsibility, he may obtain the relevant information of other players, when necessary.
A second simplifying assumption is that each player has a nite number of actions. In our example, each trader has a nite set of nancial instruments under his responsibility, and for each such instrument he chooses a time to buy or a time to sell. Thus, it can be assumed that a trader's strategy is a vector of buy and sell times, one for each nancial instrument under his responsibility.
Our model may t situations of a dierent nature, for example:
• Several countries plan to ally in a war against another country. The allying countries share a common objective -maximizing the military success against the common enemy.
In addition, each country has private objectives, such as maximizing the territories and resources it occupies during the war, and minimizing its losses. This situation has similar properties to the leading example: (1) The war is relatively short in absolute time (a modern war typically lasts a couple of weeks), but it consists of an unknown large number of stages. • A few male animals compete over the relative positions they shall occupy in the so-cial hierarchy or pack order. This competition is often settled by a war of attrition (Maynard Smith, 1974) . In most cases, the animals use ritualized ghting and do not seriously injure the opponents. The winner is the contestant who continues the war for the longest time. Excessive persistence has the disadvantage of waste of time and energy in the contest. This situation also shares similar properties with the leading example:
(1) The war of attrition is short in absolute time (usually a few hours or days), but consists of an unknown large number of stages. (2) Shmida and Peleg (1997) discuss how a normal-form correlation device can be induced in biological setups by phenotypic conditional behavior, and Sorin (1998) Stopping games were introduced by Dynkin (1969) , and later used in several models in economics, management science, political science and biology, such as research and development (see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985; Mamer, 1987) , struggle of survival among rms in a declining market (see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986) , auctions (see e.g., Krishna and Morgan, 1997) , lobbying (see e.g., Bulow and Klemperer, 2001) , conict among animals (see e.g., Nalebu and Riley, 1985) , and duels (see, e.g., Karlin, 1959) .
Much work has been devoted to the study of undiscounted two-player stopping games.
This problem, when the payos have a special structure, was studied by Neveu (1975) , Mamer (1987) , Morimoto (1986) , Ohtsubo (1991) , Nowak and Szajowski (1999) , Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2001) , Neumann, Ramsey and Szajowski (2002) , and Shmaya and Solan (2004) , among others. Those authors provided various sucient conditions under which (Nash) approximate equilibria exist. In contrast with the two-player case, there is no existence result for approximate equilibria in multi-player stopping games.
Our main result states that for every δ, > 0, a multi-player stopping game admits a sequential constant-expectation normal-form correlated (δ, )-equilibrium. We further show that the equilibrium's correlation device has two appealing properties: (1) it is canonical -each signal is equivalent to a strategy; and (2) it does not depend on the specic parameters of the game. The proof relies on a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem (Shmaya and Solan, 2004 ) that reduces the problem to that of studying the properties of correlated -equilibria in multi-player absorbing games (stochastic games with a single non-absorbing state). The study uses the result of Solan and Vohra (2002) that any multi-player absorbing game admits a correlated -equilibrium.
Another interesting question is nding such an equilibrium and characterizing the properties of the set of equilibrium payos. Our proof is not constructive, and this question remains open for future research.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the result. A sketch of the proof appears in Section 3. Section 4 contains the proof. In Section 5 we discuss how to apply our result, which formally deals only with simple stopping games, to more general situations, such as the leading example.
Model and Main Result
In the introduction, we presented an example of the strategic interaction among traders when some macroeconomic news is published (the leading example), and discussed how to model it by a stopping game. In this section we present the formal denitions, and state our main result.
A stopping game is dened as follows:
Denition 1 A stopping game is a 6-tuple G = (I, Ω, A, p, F, R) where:
• I is a nite set of players;
• (Ω, A, p) is a probability space; • F = (F n ) n≥0 is a ltration over (Ω, A, p); Remark 2 A stopping games ends as soon as one of the players stops. As discussed earlier, the strategic interaction in the leading example is more complex but it can be reduced to a stopping game, when one is interested in the question of equilibrium existence (as discussed in Section 5).
We model the pre-play communication possibilities of the players by a correlation device:
where M i is a nite space of signals the device can send player i, and (2) µ ∈ (M ) is the probability distribution according to which the device sends the signals to the players before the stopping game starts.
As discussed earlier, cheap talk communication among the players can be used to mimic a correlation device. Specically, when there are at least three players, under mild conditions on the set of Nash equilibrium payos, any correlated equilibrium can be implemented as a sequential equilibrium of an extended game with pre-play cheap talk (Ben-Porath, 1998; see also Heller, 2009 for an implementation that is resistant to coalitional deviations). This is also true for two players, under additional cryptographic assumptions (Urbano and Vila, 2002) .
Throughout the paper we denote the signal prole that the players receive from the correlation device by m. Given a normal-form correlation device D, we dene an extended game G (D). The game G (D) is played exactly as G, except that, at the outset of the game, a signal prole m = (m i ) i∈I is drawn according to µ, and each player i is privately informed of m i . Then, each player may base his strategy on the signal he received.
As mentioned earlier, Shmida and Peleg (1997, Section 5) discuss how a normalform correlation device can be induced in nature by phenotypic conditional behavior.
Specically, they present an example of butteries who compete for sunspot clearings in a forest in order to fertilize females. When two butteries meet in a sunspot, they engage in a war of attrition. The period of time each buttery was in the spot before the ghting, is used as a normal-form correlation device: a senior buttery stays for a long time in the war, while a new buttery gives up quickly.
For simplicity of notation, let the singleton coalition {i} be denoted as i, and let −i = I\ {i} denote the coalition of all players besides player i. A (behavior) strategy for
The interpretation is that x i n (ω, m i ) is the probability by which player i stops at stage n when he received a signal m i .
Let θ be the rst stage in which at least one player stops, and let θ = ∞ if no player ever stops. If θ < ∞ let S θ ⊆ I be the coalition that stops at stage θ. The expected payo of player i under the strategy prole x = (x i ) i∈I is given by γ
where the expectation E x is with respect to (w.r.t.) the distribution P x over plays induced by x. Given an event E ⊆ Ω and a set of signal proles M ⊆ M , let γ i (x|E, M ) be the expected payo of player i conditioned on E and on the signal prole being in M . Given m ∈ M , let γ i (x|E, M , m i ) denote the expected payo of player i conditioned on E, on the signal prole being in M , and on the signal of player i being equal to m i .
The strategy x i is -best reply for player i when all his opponents follow x −i if for every strategy y i of player i:
i is -best reply conditioned on
We say that a prole
if whenever the state is in E ⊆ Ω and the signal prole is in M , the expected payo of each player changes by at most when he obtains his signal. We say that x is a (δ, )-constant-expectation if this holds for some E and M with probability at least 1 − δ.
Denition 4 Let
The denition of an approximate constant-expectation correlated equilibrium generalizes Sorin (1998)'s denition of distribution equilibrium for nite normal-form games. We now briey discuss some of its properties. First, every Nash equilibrium is (0, 0)-constantexpectation correlated equilibrium. Second, unlike the set of correlated equilibria, the set of constant-expectation correlated equilibria is not convex, even for nite games, as demonstrated in the battle of the sexes game illustrated in Table 1 :
(the payo of a player is either 1 or 2, depending on his signal). Table 1 Battle of Sex -a Normal-Form Two-Player Game
As discussed earlier, constant-expectation correlated equilibria are more easily implemented in economic setups such as the leading example, as none of the players may feel discriminated against by the coordination process. The advantages of constant-expectation equilibrium in biological setups is demonstrated by Sorin (1998, Example 1) as follows.
Consider a symmetric two-player game where the payo (tness) is 1 if both players play A, 2 if both play B and 0 otherwise. Consider a correlated equilibrium in a population game: half of the population are type A -they always play against other A's and they play action A; the other half are type B -they always play against other B's and they play action B. This equilibrium does not satisfy the constant-expectation property, and it is not stable in an evolutionary setup: type B has a higher tness and would take over the whole population.
Given ω ∈ Ω, let H n (ω) ⊆ F n be the collection of all events in F n that include ω: H n (ω) = {F n ∈ F n |ω ∈ F n }. H n (ω) denote the public history of play up to stage n, when the true state is ω. Let H n be the collection of all such histories of length n: H n = {H n (ω) |ω ∈ Ω}, and let H = n=1..∞ H n be the set of all histories. Let G(H n , D, m) be the induced stopping game that begins at stage n, when each player i has received the private signal m i ∈ M i , and the public history is H n ∈ H n . For simplicity of notation, we use the same notation for a strategy prole in G (D) and for the induced strategy prole in G(H n , D, m).
As discussed earlier, we require players to be rational also o the equilibrium path. This is satised by requiring the equilibrium to be sequential (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) .
In what follows we adapt the denition of sequential equilibrium in a nite extensive-form game, to our framework of innite extended stopping games. The adaptation includes two parts: (1) Simplifying the belief system because the only source for imperfect information on past events is due to the private signals the players received from the correlation device before the game starts. (2) Dening an approximate variation of sequential equilibrium due to the inniteness of stopping games. Observe that we adopt the notation of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapters 6 and 12), and do not consider simultaneous moves as a source of imperfect information.
We begin by dening a belief system in an extended stopping game G (D) as a prole 
to the signal prole of the other players being m
the belief of player i over the signal prole, conditional on the signal prole being in M .
An assessment in an extended stopping game G (D) is a pair (x, q) where x is a strategy prole and q is a belief system. An assessment is -sequentially rational, conditioned on an event E and on M , if every player -best replies whenever the signal prole is in M and the state is in E. When = 0 it coincides with the standard denition of sequential rationality (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) . Formally:
Denition 5 Let G (D) be an extended stopping game (where D = (M, µ)), ≥ 0,
conditioned on E and M , if for every i ∈ I, ω ∈ E, n ∈ N, and signal prole m ∈ M , x i is an -best reply for player i conditioned on E and on M in the induced game G(H n (ω) , D, m), when his opponents play x −i , and his beliefs over the signal prole are
A strategy prole is completely mixed if each player assigns positive probability to every action (stop or continue) after every history. An assessment (x, q) is consistent if it is the limit of a sequence of assessments ((x n , q n )) ∞ n=1 with the following properties: (1) each strategy prole x n is completely mixed; (2) each belief system q n is derived from x n using Bayes' rule. An assessment is a sequential -equilibrium conditioned on E and M , if it is -sequentially rational (conditioned on E and M ) and consistent. Formally:
on E and M , if it is both -sequentially rational conditioned on E and M and consistent.
Denition 6 extends the standard denition of sequential equilibrium. That is, when = 0, M = M and E = Ω, it is equivalent to the standard denition of sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982 ).
An assessment is a sequential (δ, )-equilibrium if it is a sequential -equilibrium conditioned on E and M , where E and M have probabilities of at least 1 − δ. Formally:
Denition 7 Let G (D) be an extended stopping game and let δ, ≥ 0. An assessment
Abusing notation, we say that a strategy prole x is a sequential (δ, )-equilibrium of G (D)
if there is a belief system q, such that the assessment (x, q) is a sequential (δ, )-equilibrium in G (D). Observe that when the correlation device is trivial (|M | = 1) sequentiality is equivalent to subgame perfectness (Selten, 1965 (Selten, , 1975 . Specically, when |M | = 1, the denition of a (δ, )-sequential equilibrium is equivalent to the denition of a (δ, )-subgame-perfect equilibrium in Mashiah-Yaakovi (2009) . Without the limitation |M | = 1, every (δ, )-sequential equilibrium is a (δ, )-subgame-perfect equilibrium, but the converse is not true.
We now dene a sequential correlated (δ, )-equilibrium.
Denition 8 Let G be a stopping game and let δ, > 0. A sequential correlated (δ, )-equilibrium is a pair (D, x) where D is a correlation device, and x is a sequential (δ, )- 
The standard denition of a canonical correlation device for nite games (Forges, 1986) is that the set of signals is equal to the set of strategy proles. Denition 9 is dierent because the set of signals is nite, while the set of strategies is innite.
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 10 Let G = (I, Ω, A, p, F, R) be a multi-player stopping game with integrable payos (sup n∈(N ∞) R n ∞ ∈ L 1 (p)). Then for every δ, > 0, G has a sequential (δ, )-constant-expectation normal-form correlated (δ, )-equilibrium with a canonical correlation device. Moreover the correlation device only depends on the number of players and , and is independent of the payo process.
The fact that the correlation device is independent of the payo process allows the players to use the same correlation device in every stopping game (assuming the number of players and are xed), and avoid the diculties of constructing a new device for each stopping game. Thus, the traders in the leading example can construct, once and for all, a correlation deceive, and then use it for all future strategic interactions (regardless of the specic implications of the macroeconomic news that is going to be released).
Remark 11 The (δ, )-equilibrium that we construct is uniform in a strong sense: it is a (δ, 3 )-equilibrium in every nite n-stage game, provided that n is suciently large.
This can be seen by the construction itself (Proposition 17) or by applying a general observation made by Solan and Vieille (2001) .
Sketch of the Proof
A periodic stopping game is a stopping game where after a nite number of stages, if not stopped earlier, the game restarts at the rst stage. Assuming that the ltration F is nite, such games are a special kind of absorbing games (stochastic games with a single non-absorbing state). Solan and Vohra (2002) studied these games and proved that they admit a correlated -equilibrium. Adapting their result to our framework, implies that every periodic stopping game has either (1) a stationary equilibrium; or (2) a correlated distribution η over the set of action proles in which a single player stops: one player is chosen according to η and is asked to stop; incentives can be provided to ensure that the player stops.
We strengthen the result of Solan and Vohra (2002) if case (1) holds, by showing that there is a stationary sequential -equilibrium (by perturbing the game to continue with positive probability at each stage). If case (2) holds, we modify the procedure in which players are asked to stop in two ways. First, we ask each player to stop with probability 1 − (and not with probability 1 as in Solan and Vohra, 2002) , to prevent players from being able to deduce that they are o the equilibrium path (even when other players deviate). This allows us to obtain sequentiality. Second, we make sure that with high probability, when a player receives his signal, he cannot deduce, which player has been asked to stop. This modication guarantees constant-expectation (which trivially holds in the rst case). Finally, we adapt the methods of Shmaya and Solan (2004) to deal with innite ltrations as well, and prove that such periodic games admit a correlated (δ, )-equilibrium. Shmaya and Solan (2004) proved a stochastic variation of Ramsey's Theorem (1930) that allows us to divide an innite stopping game into an innite sequence of periodic stopping games, and to concatenate the correlated (δ, )-equilibrium in each periodic game, into a correlated (δ, )-equilibrium in the original innite game. We verify that the sequentiality and constant-expectation of each equilibrium in the periodic games imply the same properties for the equilibrium in the innite game. Moreover we show that the concatenated correlated equilibrium uses a correlation device which is normal-form, and only depends on the number of players and .
Proof

Preliminaries
If with probability at least 1 − δ, the dierence between the payos of two stopping games G andG is at most , then any sequential (δ, )-equilibrium in G is a sequential (3δ, 3 )-equilibrium inG. Hence now x a stopping game G and assume without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) that the payo process R is uniformly bounded and that its range is nite. In fact, we assume that for some
.., ± K K be the set of all possible one-stage payo matrices of the stopping game G. Let R n (ω) be the payo matrix at stage n.
We now x , δ > 0. Given any payo matrix d ∈ D, let A d ⊆ n∈N F n be the event that d occurs innitely often (i.o.): A d = {ω ∈ Ω|i.o. R n (ω) = d}, and let B d,k ⊆ n∈N F n be the event that d never occurs after stage k: Consider an induced game that begins after some bounded stopping time τ is reached.
The following standard lemma shows that in order to prove Theorem 10, it is enough to show that each such game has an approximate constant-expectation sequential correlated equilibrium with a canonical correlation device that depends only on |I| and .
Lemma 12 Let D = (M, µ) a canonical correlation device that depends only on |I| and , M ⊆ M a set satisfying µ(M ) > 1 − δ, E ⊆ Ω an event such that p(E) > 1 − δ, and τ a bounded stopping time. Assume that for every ω ∈ E, m ∈ M , and H = H τ (ω) ∈ H τ (ω) , there is a constant-expectation sequential -equilibrium,
This implies that G admits a sequential (δ, )-constant-expectation normal-form correlated (δ, )-equilibrium with a canonical device, which depends only on |I| and . PROOF. It is well known that any nite-stage game admits a sequential 0-equilibrium.
Since τ is bounded, p(E) ≥ 1 − δ and µ(M ) ≥ 1 − δ, the following strategy prole x is a (δ, )-constant-expectation sequential (δ, )-equilibrium:
• Until stage τ , play a sequential equilibrium, which is trivially a constant-expectation equilibrium, in the nite stopping game that terminates at τ , if no player stops before that stage, with a terminal payo γ i (x H ).
• If the game has not terminated by stage τ , from that stage on, play the prole x H in G(H, D, m).
Observe that for the concatenated prole x to be a normal-form correlated equilibrium, it is necessary that each induced game's equilibrium would be constant-expectation. Otherwise, the signal a player receives before the play starts may change his expected payos in the induced games, and this may create protable deviations from x. It is also necessary that all the correlated equilibria in the induced games use the same correlated device M .
Also observe that the sequentiality and constant-expectation of each equilibrium in the induced games, imply that x has these two properties.
Finite Trees
Generally, a stopping game has an innite length and the ltration is general. We now consider a special kind of stopping game, which is periodic and has a nite ltration. Such a game can be modeled by a game on a nite tree. The game starts at the root and is played in stages. Each node in the tree has a matrix payo (in case players stop at that node), and a distribution over its children nodes, which determines the probability that the game would continue to each of these nodes, if no player stops. Given the current node, and the sequence of nodes already visited, the players decide, simultaneously and independently, whether to stop or to continue. Let S be the set of players that decides to stop. If S = ∅, the play ends and the terminal payo to each player i is determined by the node's payo matrix. If S = ∅, a new node is chosen according to the node's distribution over its children. The process now repeats itself, with the child node being the current node. When the players reach a leaf, the new current node is the root. A game on a tree is essentially played in rounds, where each round starts at the root and ends once it reaches a leaf. Formally:
Denition 13 A stopping game on a nite tree (or simply a game on a tree) is a tuple
, where:
• I is a nite non-empty set of players;
• V, r, (C v ) v∈V \V leaf is a tree, V is a nonempty nite set of nodes, V leaf ⊆ V is a nonempty set of leaves, r ∈ V is the root, and for each v ∈ V \V leaf , C v ⊆ V \ {r} is a nonempty set of children of v. We denote by V 0 = V \V leaf the set of nodes which are not leaves; and for every v ∈ V 0 :
• p v is a probability distribution over C V ; we assume that ∀ṽ ∈ C v : p v (ṽ) > 0;
∈ D is the payo matrix at v if a nonempty coalition S stops at that node.
Given a bounded stopping time n < σ and history H n ⊆ H n , let G n,σ (H n ) be the induced stopping game that begins at stage n , when the players are informed of H n , and the game restarts at stage n (where a new ω ∈ H n is randomly chosen), if no player stopped before reaching stage σ(ω). A simple adaptation of the methods of Shmaya and Solan (2004, Sections 5-6) shows that G n,σ (H n ) can be approximated by a game on a tree, T n,σ (H n ), such that every -equilibrium in T n,σ (H n ) is a 3 -equilibrium in G n,σ (H n ). In the following paragraph we sketch the main idea behind this approximation. The reader is referred to Shmaya and Solan (2004) for the formal details.
For simplicity of presentation let σ be constant: σ = m > n. All that matters to the players at stage m, is the payo matrix at this stage (because if no player stops, the game restarts at stage n with a new random ω ∈ H n , which is independent of the information the players have on the current ω). Thus we can cluster together the F m -measurable sets according to their payo matrices, and have at most |D| leaves in the nite tree. At stage m − 1, players care both for the current payo matrix, and for the distribution of the payo matrices at the next stage. Using a nite approximation to this distribution (rounding each probability up to /2 m ), enables clustering of F m−1 -measurable sets into a nite number of vertices as well. Similarly, one can show by a recursive procedure that the entire game G n,σ (H n ) can be approximated by a stopping game on a nite tree.
Assuming that n > N 0 we perturb the game on a tree T n,σ (H n ) by not allowing players to stop in any nodev where the payo matrix Rv is inB d . That is, in such nodes, players must continue and the game goes on to one ofv's children.
Equivalence with Absorbing Games
A stopping game on a nite tree T = T n,σ (H n ) is equivalent to an absorbing game (Solan and Vohra, 2002) , where each round of T corresponds to a single stage of the absorbing game. As an absorbing game, T has two special properties: (1) it is a recursive game: the payo in the non-absorbing state is zero; (2) there is a unique non-absorbing action prole.
Given a game on a tree T , let g i be the maximal payo player i can get by stopping alone. Letṽ i be a node that maximizes the last expression, and let dṽi ∈ D be the payo matrix in that stage. Adapting Proposition 4.10 in Solan and Vohra (2002) to the two special properties gives the following:
Proposition 14 Let T be a game on a nite tree. One of the following holds:
(1) There is a stationary absorbing sequential -equilibrium x.
(2) There is a stationary non-absorbing sequential equilibrium where all the players always continue.
(3) There is a distribution η ∈ ∆(I × {ṽ i }) such that:
(c) Let the players that satisfy P η (ṽ i , i) > 0 be denoted as the stopping players. For every stopping player i there exists a player j i = i, the punisher of i, such that:
Remark 15 Solan and Vohra (2002) does not guarantee that the stationary absorbing equilibrium in case (1) is sequential . Specically, players may play irrationally after some player i is supposed to stop with probability 1 according to x i . To prevent it, we perturb the game T . Let T be a game similar to T , except that when a non-empty coalition wishes to stop at some node, there is a probability that the stopping request is ignored, and the game continues to the next stage. T is also equivalent to an absorbing game, and Solan and Vohra (2002)'s proposition can be applied. In T no node is ever o the equilibrium path, and thus any Nash equilibrium in T is subgame perfect, which is equivalent to being sequential, as the correlation device is trivial (as discussed after Denition 7). Any such stationary sequential equilibrium in T naturally denes a strategy prole in T . One can see that this prole is a stationary sequential -equilibrium in T . Solan and Shmaya (2004) presents a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem (Ramsey, 1930) , and a method to use it to disassemble an innite stopping game into games on nite trees with special properties. In this subsection we sketch the main ideas of this method, while leaving some of the formal details to the appendix.
A Stochastic Variation of Ramsey's Theorem
Let C be a nite set of colors. An F-consistent C-valued NT-function (or simply an NT-function) is a function that attaches a color c n,σ (ω) = c n,σ (H n (ω)) to every induced stopping game G n , σ (H n (ω)). Given an NT-function and two bounded stopping times τ 1 < τ 2 , let c τ 1 ,τ 2 (ω) = c τ 1 (ω),τ 2 (ω). Thus c τ 1 ,τ 2 is an F n -measurable random variable. Shmaya and Solan (2004, Theorem 4. 3) proved the following proposition :
Proposition 16 For every nite set C, every C -valued F-consistent NT -function c, and every > 0, there exists an increasing sequence of bounded stopping times 0 < σ 1 < σ 2 < σ 3 < ... such that: p (c σ 1 ,σ 2 = c σ 2 ,σ 3 = ...) > 1 − .
We now present a somewhat simplied version of the NT-function that would be used to prove Theorem 10; the exact function is described in the appendix.
, 2, 3} × W × W } be a set of colors, where the rst component denote which case of Proposition 14 holds in T n , σ (H n (ω)); the second component denotes the approximate equilibrium payo, and the third component denotes the payo of each player when he stops alone in case 3. That is, c n,σ (ω)=(case, w eq , w alone ) is dened as follows:
• case = 1 if there is a stationary absorbing equilibrium in T n , σ (H n (ω)) (that is, case
(1) of Proposition 14 holds). Otherwise, case = 2 if there is a sequential non-absorbing equilibrium in T n , σ (H n (ω)). Otherwise, case = 3 and then case (3) of Prop. 14 holds.
• w eq is the equilibrium payo in cases (1) and (2), and it is the payo that is induced from the distribution η in case (3): w eq = i∈I P η (ṽ i , i) · R j {i},ṽ i .
• w alone = g in case (3) (the maximal payo each player can get by stopping alone in T n , σ (H n (ω)) when the other players always continue), and it is arbitrarily set to 0 in cases (1) and (2).
By Proposition 16 there exists an increasing sequence of bounded stopping times 0 < σ 1 < σ 2 < σ 3 < ... such that:
. We assume w.l.o.g. that σ 1 > N 0 . Let E = Ω\ Φ ω ∈ Ω|∃n s.t. c σn,σ n+1 (ω) = c 1,2 (ω) be the event where there are no approximation errors (as dened in Subsection 4.1) and the color of all nite trees after σ 1 is the same. Observe that P (E) > 1 − δ.
Constant-Expectation Sequential Correlated Equilibrium
By Lemma 12, proving Theorem 10 only requires the following proposition:
Proposition 17 Let E and σ 1 be dened as in the previous subsection. There is a canonical correlation device D = (M, µ), and a subset M ⊆ M satisfying µ (M ) > 1 − δ, such that for every m ∈ M and every ω ∈ E, there is a sequential -constant-expectation -equilibrium conditioned on E and M , x H , in the game G(H, D, m), where H = H σ 1(ω) (ω).
PROOF. Let c = c σ 1 ,σ 2 (ω)=(case, w eq , w alone ) be the color of the game G σ 1(ω) ,σ 2 (H). Solan and Shmaya (2004) investigated 2-player stopping games, when case is equal either to 1 or 2 (case 3 is only relevant to games with more than two players). They show that one can concatenate the sequential stationary Nash /11-equilibria of each approximating game on a tree T σ k(ω) ,σ k+1 H σ k (ω) (ω) into a sequential -equilibrium (conditioned on E), x H , in the induced game without pre-play correlation G(H). The prole x H naturally induces a sequential -constant-expectation -equilibrium conditioned on E and M in G(H, D, m), given any correlation device D and any signal prole m.
For this concatenation to work when case = 1, Solan and Shmaya (2004) provided appropriate minimal bounds to the probability of termination in the rst round of the stationary approximate equilibrium of each game on a tree
, that guarantee that the concatenated prole, x H , is absorbed with probability 1. With minor adaptations Shmaya and Solan (2004) 's method works also in multi-player stopping games, as described in the appendix.
So we only have to deal with the third case (case = 3). The construction in this case is an adaptation of the procedure of Solan and Vohra (2002) , which deals with quitting games (stationary stopping games where payo is the same at all stages). The changes with respect to the original procedure are needed to guarantee constant-expectation and sequentiality (which are not satised in Solan and Vohra, 2002) . Let η = η σ 1 ,σ 2 be a correlated strategy prole in T σ 1 ,σ 2 H σ 1 (ω) (ω) that satises 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) in Proposition 14. The denition of α i H implies that α i H = w i alone . This implies that there is a distribution θ = θ(η) ∈ ∆(D H × I) such that for each player i ∈ I:
Let ζ ∈ ∆(I) be the probability that each player is being asked to stop : ζ(i) = η(d(i), i). Let (τ i k ) i∈I.k=1..∞ be an increasing sequence of stopping times dened by induction:
..,T + T + 1}, where T ∈ N is suciently large, and T >> T . Let µ D F be as follows:
(1) A numberl is chosen uniformly over 1, ...,T .
(2) The quitter i ∈ I is chosen according to ζ. Player i receives signall.
(3) A number l is chosen uniformly over l + 1, ...,l + T (4) Player j i , the punisher of player i, receives the signal l. 
Observe that according to x F the probability of stopping at each stage is strictly less than 1, thus no nite history H ∈ H is o the equilibrium path. This implies that after any history, the belief of each player over the signal prole that the other players received is derived using Bayes rule. If the players follow the strategy prole x F then the game is absorbed with probability 1 conditioned on E, and the expected payo satises α i H ≤ w i eq . Moreover, ifT >> T , then immediately after receiving his signal m i (assuming m ∈ M ) no player can infer from his signal whether or not he is the quitter, thus x F is (δ, )-constant-expectation.
We now verify that if T,T are suciently large, no player can gain too much by deviating at any stage of the game conditioned on E and M . First, the probability the quitter i ∈ I correctly guesses the punishment stage is very low, and thus he cannot prot too much by deviating. Similarly, any other player (j = i ∈ I) has a low probability of correctly guessing τ î l , the stage the quitter stops . Moreover, if T is suciently large, then, with high probability, player j does not know when he receives his signal whether he is the quitter, punisher or a regular player, and he cannot infer which of the other players is more likely to be the quitter. Therefore, player j cannot earn much by stopping before stagel.
Observe that when the quitter deviates and does not stop, his punisher does not know that he is a punisher. When the punisher has to stop, he believes (with high probability) that he is the quitter (assuming m ∈ M and that is small enough w.r.t. θ: ∀i ∈ I s.t.
This implies that the players -best reply at all stages including when they (unknowingly) punish other players, and that x F is a sequential -equilibrium in G(F, D) conditioned on E and M .
Extensions
Our formal model only dealt with simple stopping games, which end as soon as any player stops. We now discuss how to extend our result to more generalized strategic interactions, such as the leading example.
A generalized stopping game is played as follows. There is an unknown state variable, on which players receive symmetric partial information along the game. Proposition 14 also holds when each player has a nite number of dierent stopping actions, and when the payo if no player ever stops is dierent from zero. Thus, with minor adaptations, our proof is extended to cases (1) and (2).
The third case, where each player may act a nite number of times, is handled by using backward induction. The details are standard, and we only sketch here the main idea. Let m = i T i be the total number of times the players are allowed to stop. Assume by induction on m, that any generalized stopping game where players can stop at most n times, admits an equilibrium of our type (sequential normal-form correlated approximate equilibrium with a canonical correlation device). Given a generalized stopping game G with m stops, we construct an auxiliary stopping game G with the following payo process: R i S,n is equal to the payo of player i in an equilibrium of our type of induced generalized stopping game with total number of stops n − |S| that begins at stage n + 1, where the T i of each player i in S is reduced by one. Such an equilibrium exists due to the induction hypothesis. By Theorem 10, the auxiliary game G admits an equilibrium of our type x. x induces an equilibrium of our type x in the original game G in a natural way: players follow x as long as all the players continue; as soon as some of the players stop, the remaining active players play the equilibrium of the induced stopping game with fewer stops.
Appendix
In Section 4 we presented a simplied version of the coloring scheme that is used in the construction of the concatenated equilibrium. In this appendix we present the exact coloring scheme, and show how to adapt Solan and Shmaya (2004) 's methods to give appropriate lower bounds for the termination probabilities in case (1) of Proposition 14.
A.1 Limits on Per-Round Probability of Termination
In this subsection we bound the probability of termination in a single round of a game on a tree when an absorbing stationary equilibrium x exists (case (1) of Prop. 14), by adapting the methods presented in Shmaya and Solan (2004, Section 5) for two players.
A stationary strategy of player i in a game on a tree T is a function x
is the probability that player 1 stops at v. Let c i be the strategy of player i that never stops, and let c = (c i ) i∈I . Given a stationary strategy prole x = (x i ) i∈I , let γ i (x) = γ i T (x) be the expected payo under x, and let π(x) = π T (x) be the probability that the game is stopped at the rst round (before returning to the root). Assuming no player ever stops, the collection (p v ) v∈V 0 of probability distributions at the nodes induces a probability distribution over the set of leaves or, equivalently, over the set of paths that connect the root to the leaves. For each setV ⊆ V 0 , we denote by pV the probability that the path reached passes throughV . For each v ∈ V , we denote by F v the event that the path reached passes through v.
The following lemma bounds the probability of termination in a single round when the -equilibrium payo is low for at least one player. The lemma is an adaptation of Lemma 5.3 in Shmaya and Solan (2004) , and the proof is omitted as the changes are minor.
Lemma 18 Let G be a stopping game, n > 0, σ > n a bounded stopping time, H ∈ H n a history, and x an absorbing stationary 2 -equilibrium in T n,σ (H n ) such that there exists a player i with a low payo:
is the probability that if no player ever stop, the game visits
T is a subgame of T if we remove all the descendants (in the strict sense) of several nodes from the tree V, V leaf , r, (C v ) v∈V 0 and keep all other parameters xed. Observe that this notion is dierent from the standard denition of a subgame in game theory. Formally:
be two games on trees. We say that T is a subgame of T if: V ⊆ V , r = r, and for every v
Let T be a game on a tree. For each subset D ⊆ V 0 , we denote by T D the subgame of T generated by trimming T from D downward. Thus, all descendants of nodes in D are removed. For every subgame T of T and every subgame T of T , let p T ,T = p V leaf ,V leaf be the probability that the chosen branch in T passes through a leaf of T strictly before it passes through a leaf of T .
The following denition divides the histories H n into two kinds: simple and complicated. A simple history has at least one of the following properties: (1) Every player receives a negative payo whenever he stops alone. (2) There is a distribution over the set of action proles in which a single player stops, such that each player receives payo α i H when he stops, and approximately this is also his average payo when other players stop.
Denition 20 Let G be a stopping game, > 0, N 0 ≤ n, and τ > n a bounded stopping time. The history H ∈ H n is -simple if one of the following holds:
(1) For every i ∈ I: α i H < 0. or (2) There is a distribution θ ∈ ∆(D H × I) such that for each player i ∈ I:
H is simple if it is -simple for every > 0. H is complicated if it is not simple, i.e.:
∃ 0 > 0 such that H is not 0 -simple. In that case we say that H is complicated w.r.t. 0 .
The next proposition analyzes stationary −equilibria that yield high payos to all the players. The proposition is an adaptation of Prop. 5.5 in Shmaya and Solan (2004) . The proof is omitted as the changes are minor.
Proposition 21 Let G be a stopping game, N 0 ≤ n a number, σ > n a bounded stopping time, H ∈ H n a complicated history w.r.t. 0 , << 0 |I|·|D| , and for each i ∈ I let a i ≥ α i F − . Then there exists a set U ⊆ V 0 and a prole x in T = T n,σ (F ) such that:
(1) No subgame of T U has an -equilibrium with a corresponding payo in
(2) Either: (a) U = ∅ (so that T U = T ); or (b) x is a 9 -equilibrium in T, and for every i ∈ I and for every strategy y i : a i − ≤ γ i (x), γ i (x −i , y i ) ≤ a i + 8 , and
A.2 Detailed Description of The Coloring Scheme
In Subsection 4.4 we presented a simplied version of the coloring scheme that is used in the proof of Proposition 17. In this subsection, we present the details of the exact coloring scheme, which adapts the coloring scheme for two-player games in Shmaya-Solan (2004) . Specically, we provide an algorithm that attaches a color c n,σ (H) and several numbers (λ j,n,σ (H)) j for every σ > n ≥ 0 and H ∈ H n , such that c n,σ (H) is a C -valued F-consistent NT -function.
A • Set T (0) = T n,σ (H).
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ J apply Proposition 14 to T (j−1) and the bad rectangle h j = i∈I a i j , a i j + to obtain a subgame T (j) of T (j−1) and strategy prole x j in T (j) such that:
(1) No subgame of T (j) has a stationary -equilibrium with a corresponding payo in h j .
(2) Either T (j) = T • If T (J) is trivial (the only node is the root), set c n,σ (H) = allbad; otherwise due to Proposition 14 and our procedure one of the following holds:
(1) T (J) has a sequential stationary absorbing -equilibrium x, with a payo γ(x) in one of the good hyper-rectangles. Let c n,σ (H) = (1, o l ), where o l is the good rectangle that includes γ x . (2) T (J) has a sequential stationary non-absorbing equilibrium c, with a payo 0. Let c n,σ (H) = (2). in Proposition 14. Let c n,σ (H) = (3, w 1 , w 2 ) where w 1 is the hyper-rectangle that includes γ T (J) (η), and w 2 is the hyper-rectangle that includes g(T (J) ).
Each strategy prole x j , as given by Proposition 14, is a prole in T (j−1) . We consider it as a prole in T by letting it continue from the leaves of T (j−1) downward. We dene, for every j ∈ J, λ j,n,σ (F ) = p T (j) ,T (j−1) . By Proposition 16 there exists an increasing sequence of bounded stopping times 0 < σ 1 < σ 2 < σ 3 < ... such that p (c σ 1 ,σ 2 = c σ 2 ,σ 3 = ...) > 1− δ 3 .
For every ω ∈ Ω and H = H (ω) ∈ H σ 1 (ω) , let c H = c σ 1 ,σ 2 (H).
Let (A ,j , A ∞,j ) j∈J ∈ n=1..∞ F n be A ∞,j = w ∈ Ω| k=1..∞ λ j,σ k ,σ k+1 H σ k (ω) (ω) = ∞ is the event where the sum of the λ-s is innite, and A ,j = w ∈ Ω| k=1..∞ λ j,σ k ,σ k+1 F σ k (ω) ≤ |J| is the event where the sum is very small. As (A ,j , A ∞,j ) j∈J ∈ n=1..∞ F n , there is large enough N 1 ≥ N 0 and sets Ā ,j ,Ā ∞,j j∈J ∈ F N 1 that approximate A ∞,j and A ,j : (1) For each j ∈ J,Ā ,j Ā ∞,j = ∅ and Ā ,j Ā ∞,j = Ω. (2) p A ,j |Ā ,j ≥ 1 − δ 6·|J|
. (3) p A ∞,j |Ā ∞,j ≥ 1 − δ 6·|J|
. From now on, we assume w.l.o.g. that σ 1 ≥ N 1 . Let E be dened as follows (Observe that p(E ) ≥ 1 − δ):
That is, E is equal to E (dened in Subsection 4.4), except that we subtract the errors in the approximations of (A ,j , A ∞,j ) j∈J by Ā ,j Ā ∞,j j∈J .
A.3 Detailed Proof of Cases 1 and 2 of Proposition 17
In Subsection 4.5 we gave the details of the proof of Proposition 17 only when case = 3.
In this subsection we give the details of the proof for the other cases, which are adaptations of the proof for the two-player case in Shmaya and Solan (2004) . The proof is divided to 5 exhaustive cases according to the color of c H and whether H ∩Ā ∞,j = ∅.
A.3.1 There exists j ∈ J and F ∈ H such that F ⊆Ā ∞,j
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ J be the smallest index such that F ⊆Ā ∞,j . Let x j,σ k ,σ k+1 be the j th prole in the procedure described earlier, when applied to T σ k ,σ k+1 (H). Let x H be the following strategy prole in G (H, D, m): between σ k and σ k+1 play according to x j,σ k ,σ k+1 .
The procedure of the previous subsection implies the following:
• Conditioned on that the game was absorbed between σ k and σ k+1 the prole x j,σ k ,σ k+1
gives each player a payo:
